Public confidence in policing is receiving increasing attention from UK social scientists and policy-makers. The criminal justice system relies on legitimacy and consent to an extent unlike other public services; public support is vital if the police and other criminal justice agencies are to function both effectively and in accordance with democratic norms. Yet we know little about the forms of social perception that stand prior to public confidence and police legitimacy. Drawing on data from the 2003/2004 British Crime Survey and the 2006/2007 London Metropolitan Police Safer Neighbourhoods Survey, this paper shows that people think about their local police in ways less to do with the risk of victimisation (instrumental concerns about personal safety) and more to do with judgements about social cohesion and moral consensus (expressive concerns about neighbourhood stability, cohesion and loss of collective authority). Across England and Wales the police are not primarily seen as providers of a narrow sense of personal security, held responsible for crime and safety. Instead the police stand as symbolic 'guardians' of social stability and order, held responsible for community values and informal social controls. We also show that public confidence in the London Metropolitan Police Service expresses broader social anxieties about long-term social change. We finish our paper with some thoughts on a sociological analysis of public confidence, police legitimacy and the cultural place of policing: confidence (and perhaps ultimately the legitimacy of the police) might just be wrapped up in broader public concerns about social order and moral consensus.
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historical junctures. The uniformed police, as 'symbolic guardians' of social order and justice, are involved at all three levels. Most importantly the third suggests a police role, whether ceremonial/ideological or practical, which is not static but involved in processes of reinterpretation and dispute resulting from competing demands on the state and the specific circumstances which arise as it attempts to reaffirm its legitimacy. This argument places the police at the centre of a web of relationships, which, while of course implicating the maintenance of practical security, place heavy emphasis on the production, negotiation and reproduction of symbolic and social order.
And just as the police lie at the heart of state legitimation processes, policing may also be an active centre of the social order in a broader, Geertzian, sense. The police may act to produce and communicate contested meanings: order/disorder, justice/injustice, normality/deviance (Loader 2006) . Policing mediates collective identity, and as an institution relays messages of recognition and belonging or, conversely, misrecognition and exclusion (Waddington 1999) . The police are not only representatives of the nation/state and servants of the people who comprise it, they are also in some ways constructive of the diverse social groups through which the modern polity is constituted (Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Herbert 2006) . Policing and understandings of policing are suffused with messages about the condition of society, the position of people within it, and the relation between state and individual:
'Every stop, every search, every arrest, every group of youths moved on, every abuse of due process, every failure to respond to call or complaint, every racist … sexist … homophobic (comment), every diagnosis of the crime problem, every depiction of criminals -all these send small, routine, authoritative signals about societies conflicts, cleavages and hierarchies about whose claims are considered legitimate within it, about whose status identity is to be affirmed or denied as part of it' (Loader 2006: 211) Discussing views of the police among 'well-off', largely middle-aged residents of an English town, Girling et al. (2000) demonstrate the complexity of the relationship between police and community within a rubric of the ongoing imagination and reproduction of nation and state. Concluding their qualitative work, the authors suggest that the figure of the police officer is a symbol through which, simultaneously, a settled, cohesive national past can be recalled and a troubled, fractured present can be explicated. The image of the police speaks powerfully to concerns about social order, social problems, and the way in which 'things aren't what they used to be'. Such concerns are intimately bound up with concrete policing practise and policies. For example a perceived lack of street patrols is experienced as the loss of an 'identifiable authority figure, known by, and belonging to, the community' (Girling et al. 2000: 123) and reflect anxieties about changes in the social and moral order of the town:
'Here the subsequent "withdrawal" of the police is understood as a coming apart of the "glue" that once held a neighbourhood together and guaranteed its now fondly remembered quality of life.' (Girling et al. 2000: 124) .
As descriptions of the majority or dominant set of orientations toward the police, the ideas outlined above appear convincing. But it is important to recognise that they will not hold for all people or for all social groups. In particular, opinions are likely to be very 7 different among those who have long histories of difficult relations with the police or (more likely, and) who are excluded from the dominant social order the police represent. The two most important groups here are of course young people (Loader 1996; McAra and McVie 2005) and those from ethnic minority groups (Bowling and Philips 2002) . Just as the police represent for many order, stability and cohesion, to people from these social groups they may represent the unfair priorities of the dominant social order, an interfering state, or even oppression. As Loader (2006) notes, calls for policing responses to problems of low level disorder are often also calls for attention to be directed at subaltern groups, leading to potentially divergent patterns of association between the maintenance of social order, policing and confidence. Prevalent structures of feeling among marginalised or excluded groups may therefore differ significantly from the dominant tropes outlined above, although it would be a mistake to assume that confidence per se will automatically be lower (see below), or that those from subordinate groups desire very different forms of policing (c.f. Carr et al. 2007 ).
Instrumental and expressive models of public confidence in policing
Such sensibilities -wherein the police represent and condense notions of social cohesion, order and the strength of formal and informal social controls, whether these be at the local level or at that of the imagined national community (Anderson 1983 ) -may also underpin public confidence in the police. The idea motivating the current empirical investigation is as follows. When people think about the police and their 'crime-fighting' activities, they also think about what 'crime' stands for (erosion of norms and social ties that underpin group life) and what 'policing' stands for (organized defense of the norms and social ties). Individuals who are concerned about long-term social change, who see the modern world as too individualized and too atomized, then look to the police to defend a sense of order, precisely at the time when the police are themselves moving in many ways toward becoming a modern, efficient, public service shorn of such 'old-fashioned' symbolic elements (Hough 2003 (Hough , 2004a (Hough , 2007 .
Notwithstanding such 'modernization,' other current trends in policing correspond quite closely to such a symbolic or relational perspective on public confidence in policing. The National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP) and Neighbourhood Policing, for example, explicitly aim not only reduce fear of crime and improve feelings of safety, but also to reduce anti-social behaviour, improve quality of life, and increase public confidence (Tuffin et al. 2006) . These and other policies draw on the signal crimes approach (Innes 2004a (Innes , 2004b and other academic work which has suggested that it is what people feel about the police within a broad social context which is most important in influencing trust and support.
The contention of this 'expressive' model of public confidence is therefore that judgements about public effectiveness -like fear of crime -are driven not be a misplaced and abstract sense of 'crime out of control', but rather by lay assessments of cohesion, social control and civility that reflect concerns about the breakdown and fragmentation of society (for speculation about this, see inter alia: Biderman et al. 1967; Garofalo & Laub 1978; Merry, 1981; Scheingold 1984; Sparks, 1992; Bursik and Gramsick 1993; Dowds and Ahrendt 1995; Hale 1996; Girling et al. 1998; Taylor & Jamieson 1998; Girling et al. 2000; Freiberg 2001; Jackson 2004) . As Girling et al. (2000: 45) argue, anxiety about crime expresses people's sense of the place they inhabit and of: 8 '…their place within a world of hierarchies, troubles, opportunities and insecurities ...
[the] wider domain of moral judgements, attachments and arguments about blaming, explaining and diagnosing diverse questions of order and insecurity as these arose for them in the particular settings of their daily life.' According to such a perspective, confidence in the effectiveness of local policing is shaped by public perceptions of social order and cohesion. It follows that both fear of crime and confidence express the same judgements of community conditions. The neo-Durkheimian model developed by Jackson & Sunshine (2007) takes this as its starting point (cf. Freiberg, 2001) , proposing that a sense of order and cohesiveness -the day-to-day things that define a healthy social environment and constitute conditions conducive to crime -is key. People look to the police to be guardians of social order -as prototypical representatives of the community (Sunshine & Tyler 2003b ) -and when norms and values are seen to be in decline, they turn to the police to defend the moral structure and reassert a sense of social control. In this way, the police are both a symbolic and a practical means of reconstituting a shaky social order.
ii Jackson (2004) found that these attitudes and anxieties shaped how people made sense of the stability of their neighbourhood, and thus indirectly shaped consequent worries about crime. Might the same hold true for public confidence in policing?
In contrast, the instrumental model states that fear of crime erodes faith in the criminal justice system; anxiety about victimization erodes confidence and support for the police, and leads people to take punitive stances on issues of sentencing and criminal justice . The public look to the police to perform an instrumental role: to make people feel safe. If this model holds to improve public support the police should attempt to dampen down excessive fear and correct inaccurate beliefs about crime, perhaps by educating the public or by publicizing police successes.
Study one

Method
Concerned primarily with establishing rates of victimisation in the general population, the British Crime Survey (BCS) also addresses a range of crime-related topics, including fear of crime, public confidence in policing, and exposure to illegal drugs. The 2003/2004 sweep had a core sample of 37,000 and a boost of 3,000 individuals from non-white groups. The analysis presented here draws upon data from a sub-sample (specifically, sub-sample D2 which contains data from one-eighth of all respondents) since only this sub-sample were fielded all the questions needed for the analysis. The analysis proceeds in four steps.
iv The first is the statistical assessment of the partial association between fear and confidence, controlling for a range of factors but with a particular interest in levels of crime in respondents' neighbourhoods. It could be that fear of crime acts as a proxy for more objective conditions. So, fear of crime might be a statistically significant predictor of confidence not because it is causally related, but rather because crime is the real causal factor, and crime is related to both fear and confidence. But if fear of crime is associated with confidence net of levels of crime then it really is about perception: in highcrime areas, people who report no fear will typically feel that their local police force is doing a good job (despite the incidence of crime); in low-crime areas, people who feel anxious 9 about crime will typically have little confidence in the police (despite the incidence of crime).
The second step is to introduce into the model people's perceptions of disorder, cohesion and informal social control in their neighbourhood. If these perceptual variables are more important than worry about crime then we have some evidence for the neo-Durkhiemian model. Namely, that more day-to-day issues of neighbourhood stability and breakdown come to the fore when people evaluate police performance. The third step of analysis is to assess the extent to which fear of crime and social perception play roles in shaping public confidence in policing across localities of differing crime rates. For example, it may be that fear of crime has a greater impact in areas of high crime; perception of social cohesion and collective efficacy may have a greater impact in areas of low crime. It could be a 'luxury' to think of the police as old-fashioned defenders of norms, values and a sense of community cohesion: with greater problems of crime, people may desire a more instrumental sense of reassurance. Accordingly, this study estimates interaction effects between, separately, fear of crime and crime, and social perception and crime.
The fourth step integrates the preceding analysis, using structural equation modelling to test a full meditational model that makes several predictions. First, levels of crime predict perceptions of the environment (disorder and social cohesion). Second, perceptions of the environment shape assessments of the likelihood of victimisation. Third, both perceptions of the environment and assessments of likelihood influence both worry about crime. Finally, perceptions of the environment are hypothesised to predict public confidence in policing.
Results
Defining and measuring concepts
Public confidence in policing is measured using a 'global' measure, where respondents are asked whether they thought that their local police force were doing an excellent, good, fair, poor or very poor job. The 2003/2004 BCS did not field questions that covered specific dimensions of effectiveness, fairness and community engagement (see Bradford et al. in press) , unfortunately. However the global measure is assumed to tap into an amalgam of effectiveness, fairness and community engagement (for evidence on this see .
Separate indices are constructed from multiple indicators of (a) worry about crime v , (b) perception of incivilities, (c) perception of social cohesion, (d) perception of informal social control (collective efficacy, see Sampson et al. 1997; Sampson & Raudenbush 1999) , and (e) interviewer assessment of disorder. Using ordinal latent trait modelling with full information maximum likelihood estimation (using Latent Gold 4.0), factor scores are saved to create a single index for each construct. Ordinal latent trait analysis treats the indicators as ordinal categorical variables (compared to treating them as continuous) -which of course they are. Full information maximum likelihood estimation draws upon all possible information, meaning one does not drop missing values nor substitute them with the mean (for example). The Appendix Table shows the factor loadings, which are acceptable for the present purposes.
Control variables
The control variables are gender, age, ethnicity, social class, household income, area-type (rural, urban and inner-city), and whether or not the respondent had been a victim of crime in the previous 12 months. While the BCS gathers data on public contact with the police, most 10 of these data pertain to survey follow-up A. The analysis had to exclude either aspects of social perception (included in follow-up D) or police contact. Because the focus of the study is on social perception, the impact of public encounters with the police on public confidence in policing is not assessed (for this see Skogan 2006; Bradford et al. in press) .
Modelling public confidence in policing
The first step is to examine the association between worry about crime and public confidence in policing, controlling for the variables listed above. Because the response variable is ordinal (five categories) ordinal regression is used since it allows one to specify a categorical variable as the response but unlike multinomial logistic regression takes into account the ordered nature of the measure. SPSS (version 15) employs a proportional odds model. Therefore, if the explanatory variable increases by one unit while all other explanatory remain unchanged, the odds are multiplied by exp(B) for every category of the response variable. Table I (Model I) shows that victimization experience is associated with low levels of confidence. Males are more likely to judge their local police to do a poor job than females, as are older people; Blacks and Asians are more likely to judge their local police positively than Whites, corresponding to results from more recent waves of the BCS which have reported confidence to be higher in Black and Asian ethnic groups than among Whites (for example see Jansson et al. 2007: 9) . Social class, household income and area type (rural versus innercity and urban versus inner-city) are not statistically significant predictors. Model I also shows a statistically significant association between worry about crime and dissatisfaction with the local police (exp(B) 1.375; p<.001): thus, for every one unit increase in level of worry we expect the odds of moving from one category to the next to increase by 37.5%. In other words the greater the intensity of worry about crime, the worse the rating of local police performance.
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE
However once one controls for lay perceptions of disorder, social cohesion and informal social control, the impact of worry about crime on public confidence in local policing decreases somewhat (Model II, Table I ). Instead public perception of incivility and informal social control is more important. Therefore -and as found by Jackson & Sunshine (2007) -it is perception of cohesion more than worry about crime that seems to drive public confidence in policing. However contrary to Jackson & Sunshine (2007) disorder and fear of crime are each statistically significant predictors of public satisfaction with the police.
It is striking how little effect area-level measures of crime and quality of the living environment has on public confidence in policing (in sharp contrast to the findings of Sampson & Bartusch's 1998 Chicago study). In Model II, neither crime levels, quality of the environment, nor interviewer assessment of disorder predicts public confidence in policing. Clearly fear of crime, perceptions of disorder and informal social control are far more important to public confidence in policing than objective measures of crime and disorder.
The next step is to assess whether the level of crime in an area alters the relative importance of worry about crime, public perceptions of disorder and lay concerns about social cohesion. Fear might reasonably play a stronger role in public confidence in policing in an area of high crime than in an area of low crime. Strikingly however, when interaction effects between the IMD measure of crime and each of the four perceptual variables are entered into 11 the regression model none are statistically significant (the parameter estimates are not presented here for reasons of brevity). These findings show that it does not matter whether respondents lived in an area with high levels of crime or not -perceptions of disorder and cohesion still drive dissatisfaction with the local police with equal weight.
Modeling fear of crime and public confidence in policing in the BCS
The final step is to test an integrative model of fear of crime and public confidence in policing. Figure I presents the results, produced using AMOS 7.0. The fit of the model is good according to approximate fit indices (RMSEA=.041, CFI=.946), but not according to tests of exact fit (χ 2 7859, 124 df, ρ<.001). As is customary however, the researcher places most importance on the approximate fit indices since the Chi-Square statistic is extremely sensitive to sample size. The first thing to note from Figure I is that confidence in the local police is associated more with public perception of disorder and informal social control than with worry about crime. Secondly, a good deal of the statistical effect of judgements of community conditions (disorder, cohesion and informal social control) on worry about crime is mediated by the assessment of victimisation risk. However, there is a strong direct association between disorder and worry about crime, which suggests that fear of crime is correlated with both the judgement of victimisation risk and a more diffuse sense of disorder in the environment. Moreover, social cohesion has a small predictive role with fear of crime, so feeling that one has a supportive community around one may be associated with lower anxieties about one's personal safety. Finally, the statistical effect of living in a high-crime area on perceived risk, worry about crime, and confidence in policing is almost entirely mediated through perception of disorder, cohesion and informal social control. An effect decomposition shows total standardised effects of crime levels on (a) worry about crime of .179 and (b) confidence in policing of .087, with nearly all of these being indirect effects.
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Study two
Study one showed that while neighbourhood crime levels and worry about crime have small impacts on confidence in the local police, far more important were perceptions of social cohesion, informal social control and especially levels of perceived disorder (net of actual levels of crime and interviewer assessments of respondent's local area). The latter two set of concerns had large, significant effects on confidence. Ideas about disorder and social cohesion also had indirect effects, with their impact on public confidence in policing mediated by fear of crime.
However some of the tools available in the BCS for this analysis were relatively broad-brush. First, the measure of confidence in the police in study one was a single global indicator. Such overall ratings ('How good or bad a job are the local police doing?') are likely to encompass ideas about police effectiveness, fairness and engagement with the community. But it is useful to tease these apart. Study two focuses on just one of these elements, public confidence in the effectiveness of the police. Second, conceptualisations about the position of the police within structures of feeling which encompass both nation, state and belonging and ideas about crime, law and disorder are only partly represented in data representing perceptions of cohesion, social control, crime and disorder alone; concerns about broader social change and attitudes toward law and order are potentially just as important. In short, the police may be judged to be ineffective not when they 'fail' to control crime, but when the community and wider society is experienced as breaking down and when law and order is not respected.
Method
The Metropolitan Police's Safer Neighbourhoods Survey (SNS) provides an opportunity (a) to take local area effects better into account, (b) to more precisely measure confidence in police effectiveness, and (c) to broaden out the analysis to include concerns about law, order and wider social change. Conducted during April, May and June 2006 through a programme of face-to face interviews in the homes of respondents, the Safer Neighbourhoods Survey obtained responses from a sample of 2,844 residents in 7 wards across London, or in around 400 in each. These 7 areas were chosen to represent a diverse cross-section in sociodemographic terms (according to ACORN and Indices of Multiple Deprivation data) and to be spread throughout London. Selection of respondents was carried out using random probability sampling techniques in each of the 7 wards sampled. vi SEM is again used in the analysis. A model is developed which combines similar variables to those used in study one with measures representing wider attitudes to law, order and long-term social change. It also proposes a similar set of relationships. Both wider attitudes and 'objective' local conditions are expected to affect ideas about neighbourhood disorder and social control: concerns about social change and law/order are assumed to be deeply held -constitutive of other ideas and feelings -and therefore formative of perceptions of local disorder and levels of informal social control. Net of the condition of their local area, people who perceive a breakdown in society generally are likely to perceive a greater level of disorder in their neighbourhood. Secondly, concerns about local disorder and informal control are expected to in turn influence worry about crime. Thirdly, wider social concerns, neighbourhood concerns and worry about crime are all expected to affect public confidence in the effectiveness of the police.
Results
Results from the SEM model (using AMOS 7.0) are shown in Figure II . The model is specified in such a way as to replicate the analysis used in study one as closely as possible. The latent variables in the model mirror the ordinal latent trait constructs shown in study one, and the indicators (along with standardised regression coefficients for the measurement parts of the model) are shown in the Appendix Table. The 'objective' condition of the local area is represented in two ways: dummy variables for the survey wards; and a latent construct measuring interviewer's assessments the level of litter, vandalism and housing conditions of the interviewees home and its immediate area (see Appendix Table) . Note that for ease of interpretation and presentation effects from the six dummy variables that represent the seven wards are omitted from Figure II . But in essence, the effect of ward of residence is held constant when estimating all parts of the structural model. Figure II shows that the model fitted well according to the approximate fit measures (RMSEA=0.039; CFI=0.939). As envisaged, the condition of respondent's homes and immediate locality (as measured by interviewers) predicts both perceptions of local disorder and informal social control and, through these, worry about crime and views about police effectiveness. There is also a significant direct path from interviewer assessments to police effectiveness. Net of respondent's ward and the 'real' level of neighbourhood disorder, concerns about long-term social change and attitudes toward law and order also predict perceptions of neighbourhood disorder and social control, and through these worry about crime and ideas about police effectiveness. There is also a direct path from concerns about long term social change to police effectiveness. Finally, and most importantly for the ideas developed here, real and perceived neighbourhood disorder and concerns about informal social control are stronger predictors than public confidence in the effectiveness of the police than does worry about crime. Furthermore, the size of the direct statistical effect of concerns about long-term social change on ideas is at least as large, if not larger, than the direct statistical effect of worry about crime; ideas about long term social change and law and order also have mediated predictive paths to confidence in police effectiveness.
vii INSERT FIGURE II NEAR HERE
The model shown in Figure II again offers strong support for the idea that in making assessments of their local police people draw on perceptions of local disorder and cohesion far more than on the extent to which they worry about crime. While the police may be held to account over crime and blamed if people feel more worried by it, ideas about police effectiveness are influenced far more by feelings about low-level social disorder, mechanisms of informal social control, and wider concerns. On an instrumental view, while the first of these might be within the police's power to influence, such issues are generally far beyond the independent influence of the police. But perhaps more importantly it is hard to imagine that the link between (for example) concerns about decline in a shared sense of right and wrong and poor police performance is fully articulated, or even consciously expressed. It seems more likely that the police are indeed acting as a condensation symbol, perhaps for both the community (nation) within which such values are decaying and the state which does not step in to shore them up.
Finally, Figure II suggests that concerns about long-term social change, perceptions of changes in belonging, trust and shared values, have an impact on ideas about police effectiveness to a much greater extent than do attitudes toward law and order. The later represents opinions concerning other institutions -the family, the courts and schools (see Appendix Table) -while the former latent variables cover concerns about people living in the local area. The police may be blamed to an extent for perceived failings of other institutions, but more pertinently there is a suggestion of a deep association between police and community. Perhaps the police are indeed prototypical group representatives, an available, and obvious, receptacle for feelings of dislocation, decline, and the breakdown in trust and shared values.
Discussion
Investigating the relationship between public confidence in the police and broader social concerns about moral consensus and social cohesion, the two studies presented here support the argument that confidence expresses concerns about neighbourhood stability and broader social anxieties. Across England and Wales public confidence in policing was associated with lay judgements of disorder and informal social control (or collective efficacy). Moreover once these relationships were accounted for, fear of crime was only weakly correlated with satisfaction with local policing. This pattern of relationships held no matter the actual level of crime (according to police statistics summarised by the IMD at the level of Electoral Ward).
14 In both high and low crime areas, therefore, disorder and informal social control were associated with public confidence in police. Even controlling for interviewer assessments of disorder had no impact on the role of interviewee perception: disorder really was in the 'eye of the beholder' (Merry 1981; Harcourt 2001; Sampson & Raudenbush 2004; Jackson 2004; cf. Gau & Pratt, 2008) . In sum, the data suggest that individuals became dissatisfied with their local police force partly as a result of judging their streets and their community to lack order and informal social control -a lack of confidence was only weakly explained by public fears over crime. On an immediate level this is perhaps not surprising: low-level disorder and incivilities are likely to be much more common, and therefore more meaningful, in the lives of many people than the experience of serious or even more 'ordinary' criminality.
viii Although local-level data from London broadly confirmed these findings (study two) this second set of data also went further. Worry about crime had only a moderately strong correlation with views about police effectiveness, while more important factors were views about local disorder and informal social control. These in turn were affected not only by objective local conditions but by ideas about wider changes in society and orientations toward law and order (see also Jackson 2004) . There was also a direct link between the former and evaluations of police effectiveness. It is not just that disorder is more common in people's lives and therefore drives confidence in the police; such disorder is experienced and interpreted in the light of broader orientations toward both law and order and wider social change. However, it is likely that the current model should be seen, more broadly, to involve feedback. Specifically, confidence in policing might inculcate a sense of 'ontological security' (Loader 2006) and encourage a more trusting and positive relationship to one's social and physical environment, thus lowering perceptions of disorder/cohesion, and in turn reducing fear of crime and increasing confidence over time. As with all studies based on cross-sectional data, we have only one snapshot. But while there a clear issue of endogeneity in the present investigation, the order we presented in the model is most suitable to our comparison of the instrumental and expressive models of public confidence in policing.
Therefore -and as found by Jackson & Sunshine (2007) -these two studies showed that lay judgements of community conditions drove both fear of crime and public confidence in policing. The more people felt their environment to lack civility, trust and informal social control, the more they felt at risk of crime, the more they worried, and (independently of fear) the greater the dissatisfaction with policing. This finding strengthens existing evidence that fear of crime is less about some abstract sense of the crime problem and more an expression of day-to-day concerns about civility, trust and social stability (Bannister 1993; Girling et al. 2000; Jackson 2006 . It also appears that people think about the police less in terms of 'risk' and 'crime' (as Garland, 2001 , put it) and more in terms of local disorder, civility and social order. Incivilities signal to observers that individuals and authorities have lost control over the community and are no longer in the position to preserve order. Disorder represents disrespect to local norms; it communicates that commonly accepted standards concerning public behaviour are being eroded. People look to the police to reassert social control and protect a desired sense of ease, predictability and civility in their environment. They look to the authority of the group -the formal agent of social control which represents both nation and state -to defend and restore the norms, values and social cohesion of the community seen to be under threat Sunshine & Tyler 2003a; Jackson & Sunshine 2007) .
ix The reasons behind public anxieties about crime and the function and performance of the police thus lie much deeper than 'mere' criminality: public confidence in policing might 15 just express a whole host of concerns about social cohesion and moral consensus (Jackson 2004 (Jackson , 2006 Jackson & Sunshine 2007 ; see also Freiberg's (2001) discussion of the 'deeper emotional or affective dimensions of crime and its place in society.').
On this basis it seems that the public have a conception of security and concomitant policing practices which is both wide and deep (Loader 2006; Loader & Walker 2007) . As well as problems related to crime, a whole range of social and economic issues have an impact on fear of crime and confidence in the police. The natural response to this -indeed one which the public appears to desire -is the provision of what Loader has called pervasive policing. However, while there seems little doubt that the public wants the police to 'bring back' social control and a more stable, predictable environment -and while these issues are important in reducing fear of crime and victimization and increasing confidence in the police -there must be considerable uncertainty as to whether many of the things people want the police to do are within its power to address. The resonance with Reiner's (2007) recent exploration of the political-economic roots of much crime and disorder is strong -the causes of the issues important to the public run much deeper than a police response in any normal sense can reach.
The 'broken windows' thesis (Wilson and Kelling 1982) , and associated policing practices, would depart from this latter point in suggesting that dealing with minor incivilities and local disorder can have some effect on the incidence of crime -in short, it is not all about root causes (Sousa and Kelling 2006) . Evidence from the two studies reported above appears to suggest public support for this idea: opinions of the police may be based primarily on the prevalence of such problems and implicitly on the police's ability to deal with them. But such a suggestion would probably be mistaken. Recall that the bulk of the effects described above can be attributed to perceptions of disorder; the issue of 'broken windows', in policy terms at least, is aimed at addressing real disorder and decay. If it is broader concerns about decline in society which drive perceptions of disorder and through them confidence in the police, such root causes of confidence are indeed likely to be deeper than fixing broken windows (Kelling and Coles 1996) can address, no matter what effect such policies may have on crime itself (Harcourt 2001; Xu et al. 2005) .
Finally, it is notable that the analysis presented here replicates results from more recent waves of the BCS in suggesting that confidence is higher among those from Black and Asian ethnic groups than it is in the majority White population.
x Such findings seem counterintuitive in light of the ideas positioning the police as representative of nation, state and belonging. It might be assumed that the ethnic majority feels more affiliation to structures which it, after all, dominates. However, analysis of data from 20 years of the BCS (Bradford 2008) has shown that the current position is primarily a result of falls in trust and confidence among Whites relative to other groups. It may be that association of the police with a present experienced as fragmented and troubled, with the concomitant stresses on confidence this implies, is particularly keenly felt among those who cling most firmly to the other vision of policing, that which conjures up images of a more cohesive national past and which is linked to a story of decline. Such people seem likely to be over-represented in the White group compared with others, although further work would be needed to properly substantiate this claim.
Conclusions
What -in this final analysis -are the implications of this paper for public policy? With high profile initiatives of 'reassurance' policing currently taking place across England & Walesinitiatives that are intended 'to impact upon the linked problems of fear of crime and lack of public support' (Sharp 2005: 456) -there is a pressing need to systematically assess what drives public confidence in policing. It is sometimes said that fear of crime erodes faith in the criminal justice system. The public has an exaggerated and irrational sense of the crime problem, meaning the police do not get the credit they deserve when crime rates fall, as they have done over the past decade and more. If this idea is correct, to improve public support the police might look to dampen down excessive fears and correct inaccurate beliefs about crime, perhaps by educating the public or by publicizing police successes. Yet this study suggests that narrow attempts to reduce fear and communicate the reality of crime will not improve public confidence. Rather, people look to the police to defend everyday civility, norms and social controls, and when these are seen to be under threat, individuals lose faith in the effectiveness of their local police force. Disorder, cohesion and moral consensus -these are the things that people feel. Individuals look to the police to defend group cohesion and values (Sunshine & Tyler 2003b; Jackson & Sunshine 2007) ; formal agents of social control are called upon when informal processes are seen to be failing (cf. Hawdon's (2008) discussion of social capital and public confidence in the police).
This study supports current policing strategies that look to engage more and more with the day-to-day social order of civil public space and civil society. In particular, it backs the signal crimes perspective underpinning reassurance policing strategies being carried out across England and Wales (Innes 2004b; Millie & Herrington 2004; Herrington & Millie 2006) . A reassurance strategy seeks to increase the visibility, accessibility and familiarity of the police (Innes 2004a) . It looks to identify those (symbolic) events that the public identify as troubling -those which signal a weak social order -and deal with them. In this way, the police hope to improve fear of crime and public confidence in policing, rendering the police as a more visible symbol of social control (see Manning 1997 Manning , 2003 . The findings here support reassurance policing strategies: both fear of crime and public confidence in policing flow from day-to-day signs of social cohesion and control. Moreover, narrow attempts to reduce public concerns over safety will not improve public confidence; programmes to address lay concerns about disorder and informal social control are much more likely to secure support for the police (Bridenball and Jesilow 2008; Innes 2004a Innes , 2004b . The public appear to demand what Loader (2006) calls 'ambient policing,' as described in a series of articles by Innes (which prefer the labels 'reassurance policing' and 'signal crimes').
If some crimes are signals not only of criminality, but also provide messages about a broader set of social problems, it is possible that these are driving perceptions of disorder and lack of informal social control and in turn affecting confidence in the police. The signal crimes approach suggests that it should be possible to identify these crimes and provide a policing response to them, resulting in increased reassurance, decreased fear of crime and other benefits. However it should be noted that the model developed here holds perceptions of disorder and community cohesion (and mediated through these 'real' community characteristics, such as crime rates) to be driving fear of crime, not the other way round. A much wider set of issues than just signal crimes appears to be generating generalized fear of crime. Even if these important crimes were dealt with adequately the much greater range of social issues they signal, present in people's lives in many other ways, will still have an impact. In the public mind, then, notions of 'crime' and 'policing' seem to stand for the form and structure of society, for things that threaten or protect values and morals, and for how successfully society regulates itself. Such representations range far beyond generally accepted notions of what 'crime' is or who should deal with it. Disorders and incivilities as much as crimes per se communicate the failure of the community to self-regulate. Experiences of these arouse passions -they strike at the norms and values of the group, attack community cohesion, and reveal inadequate social controls. The police, representatives of both community (nation) and state, become associated with, and blamed for, these failures. This may be why crime and policing are so salient in the public mind: they reveal, specifically, the condition of the community and, generally, the state of society. When people think about crime and policing they think about social control and cohesion, about the norms, morals and values of certain groups, and the state of social order: concerns about crime and police effectiveness may thus serve as a lay seismograph of social cohesion and moral consensus.
Notes
i There has been a small number of notable North American studies that capture the various relationships between fear of crime, concerns about neighbourhood disorder, and public confidence in policing. Cao et al. (1996) drew on data from a postal survey of Cincinnati residents to show that relatively strong public concerns about neighbourhood disorder (and separately) collective efficacy were associated with relatively low levels of confidence in police effectiveness and engagement with the community. Importantly for the current study, fear of crime was a statistically significant predictor of public confidence, before neighbourhood concerns about disorder and collective efficacy were included in the regression model, but not after. Reisig & Parks (2000) analyzed data from telephone interviews of residents of Indianopolis (Indiana) and St. Petersburg (Florida) to assess the relative contribution of four factors in explaining levels of confidence in the police: encounters with the police; perceived neighbourhood conditions (crime levels, safety on the streets walking alone after dark, disorder, and general satisfaction with the area as a place to live); and actual neighbourhood conditions (census measures of concentrated disadvantage, and police measures of homicide rates). They found that perceptions of neighbourhood conditions (all were statistically significant net of the effect of covariates), encounters with the police (negatively-received encounters had the biggest effect) and concentrated disadvantage (but not homicide levels) all predicted levels of confidence. Indeed public perceptions of their neighbourhood were stronger predictors of public confidence in the police than (a) neighbourhood levels of poverty and homicide and (b) encounters with the policefurther evidence that the public hold 'the police accountable for the quality of life in the neighbourhood' (Reisig & Parks, 2000: 610) . A third study found that Canadians tended to be less satisfied with their local police when they perceived high levels of disorder around them (Sprott & Doob, 2008) ; however, perceptions of personal safety was also a statistically significant predictor of confidence, even holding constant public concerns about disorder.
ii Moreover, people who identified with the morals and values the police represent were more likely to express confidence in police activities. Drawing on social identity theory from social psychology, the argument put forward was that people look to the police not just to defend group values and norms, but also to exemplify them, because the police are authorities of the group. Social identity theory predicts that people judge the authority of the group by the extent to which that authority is a prototypical representative of the group, and this is especially so for people who strongly identify with the group. This was found to be the case with the police (Jackson & Sunshine 2007) . One way that the police communicated the values they espoused was through the dignity and fairness with which they were seen to treat people (e.g. Sunshine & Tyler 2003b; Tyler & Huo 2002) . iv The British Crime Survey includes a complex sampling design with weights. This affects our analysis in two ways: first we need to weight to make up for unequal sampling probabilities; and second we need to be careful about any possible effect of design effects on the size of standard errors. We dealt with former by including as covariates in the regression modeling a variable that captures the type of area in which respondents live (inner-city, urban or rural) and a variable that measures household size (number of adults in the house). Holding constant these two factors allows us to weight for unequal address selection probabilities across Police Force Areas, for unequal individual selection probabilities, and for inner-city non-response. The latter issue (design effects) means that standard errors are underestimated due to the complex sampling design. To correct for this we would require primary sampling unit identifies. However the Home Office does not release these data for reasons of anonymity. Moreover the 2003/04 BCS Technical Report does not report design effects for the relevant variables, which would allow us to correct this manually. v Measures of the frequency of worry were used (for discussion, see Farrall & Gadd 2004; Farrall 2004; Hough 2004b; Jackson 2005; Gray et al. in press) . vi A three-stage sample selection process was employed within each ward, entailing: random probability sampling of household addresses; the random selection of a dwelling unit in cases where a single address included more than one unit; and the random selection of an adult to be targeted for interview in cases where a household contained more than one adult. vii One of the limitations of traditional regression modelling is that one estimates the statistical effects of the explanatory variables on the response variable -when the explanatory variable increases by one unit of membership we predict a particular change in the response variable -but one implicitly assumes that a change in one explanatory variable is not related to a change in another explanatory variable. By contrast, structural equation modelling allows one to model such knock-on effects. In Study Two, the (standardised) effect decomposition was as follows. The total effect of 'concerns about long-term social change' was 0.245 (.105 direct and 0.140 indirect through perception of disorder, informal social control, and worry about crime). The total effect of 'attitudes towards law and order' was 0.048 (all indirect through perception of disorder, social cohesion/informal social control, and worry about crime). The total effect of 'perception of neighbourhood disorder' was 0.421 (0.362 direct and 0.059 indirect through worry about crime). The total effect of 'perception of neighbourhood informal social control' was 0.076 (0.069 direct and 0.008 through worry about crime). The total effect of worry about crime was 0.069 (all direct). viii We should add that the core finding (that public perceptions of neighbourhood disorder and social cohesion are more strongly associated with confidence in policing than fear of crime) replicate across numerous sweeps of the British Crime Survey (Jackson et al., in press ). ix One drawback of this study is that confidence in policing was measured using a global measure. Future work should treat public confidence in policing as multi-dimensional (see Sunshine & Tyler, 2003a & 2003b . In fact following Home Office consultation the 2005/2006 BCS fields an expanded set of indicators that cover numerous components, including perceptions of the fairness and integrity of the police. These items will allow a more complete assessment of public confidence in policing.
x Of course, 'White' in this context includes people who are not White British and therefore not part of the ethnic majority in the UK. However within the White group views of White British people are likely to be very dominant. took 4 levels: 'good job'; 'fair job'; 'poor job'; and 'very poor job'. The Brant test revealed a violation of the parallel odds assumptions only in one of the income insecurity contrasts. Given that income insecurity is here treated only as a control variable, it was decided to go ahead with the ordinal regression. b Assessed by the interviewer. c reference category: 'Inner-city' d reference category: 'White' e reference category: 'Professional' f reference category: 'Impossible to find £100' g Scores saved from ordinal latent trait modelling of (2-4) single indicators for each latent construct using full information maximum likelihood estimation. Software used: LatentGold 4.0. Unweighted data. Base n for Model I = 3,650, for Model II = 3,650. Source: sub-sample D2 of the 03/04 British Crime Survey. 
Interviewer assessment of disorder
Are teenagers hanging around in the street a problem in this area? 0.63
In the immediate area, how common is litter/rubbish? 0.83 Is drinking in the street a problem in this area? 0.59
In the immediate area, how common is vandalism, graffiti, or damage to properties? 0.80
Attitudes toward law and order
In the immediate area, how common are houses in poor condition/run down? 0.80 Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional values 0.55
People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences 0.67
Schools should teach children to obey authority 0.72
Concerns about long term social change
Sense of belonging to the local community 0.81 Sense of trust amongst people who live here 0.88 Sense of right and wrong amongst people who live here 0.84
Police effectiveness
Respond to emergencies promptly 0.52 Provide a visible patrolling presence 0.57 Tackle gun crime 0.64 Support victims and witnesses 0.70 Tackle dangerous driving 0.68 Deal with teenagers hanging around 0.77 Deal with people being drunk or rowdy 0.77 Study One: Latent Gold 4.0 and full information maximum likelihood estimation was used; a one-factor latent trait model was estimated separately for each latent construct; factor loadings are standardised coefficients estimated from each of the five separate models. Study Two: Standardised regression coefficients derived from the SEM model shown in Figure 2 . Sources: Sub-sample D2 of the 03/04 British Crime Survey; Metropolitan Police Safer Neighbourhoods Survey 2006/07
